Encrypt and decrypt text with AES-GCM
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This tool encrypts plaintext using AES-GCM with a password-derived 256-bit key (PBKDF2-SHA256) and produces a portable payload format: salt.iv.ciphertext. You can also decrypt compatible payloads by providing the same password and iteration count. It is designed for quick secure-note tests, API secret handling checks, and local crypto debugging. No input is uploaded; all operations run with Web Crypto in your browser.
Bad input: Encrypting with CBC while consumer expects GCM.
Failure: Decryption fails or integrity checks are bypassed incorrectly.
Fix: Pin algorithm/mode/padding contract explicitly and test cross-service vectors.
Bad input: Static IV copied into multiple encrypted payloads.
Failure: Security guarantees weaken and some decrypt paths become predictable.
Fix: Generate unique IV/nonce per encryption event and store/transmit it safely.
Bad input: Ciphertext generated in CBC mode is parsed as if it includes GCM tag.
Failure: Decryption fails intermittently and logs expose misleading errors.
Fix: Version ciphertext format and bind mode metadata to payload contracts.
Bad input: Service reuses fixed IV for many records under one AES key.
Failure: Ciphertext patterns leak and cryptographic guarantees degrade.
Fix: Generate unique random IV per encryption operation.
Bad input: Decrypt path ignores authentication tag failure and still returns plaintext.
Failure: Tampered ciphertext may be accepted as valid data.
Fix: Treat auth tag mismatch as hard failure and stop processing.
Recommend: Prefer authenticated modes (e.g., GCM) with strict nonce handling.
Avoid: Avoid legacy non-authenticated modes unless compatibility is unavoidable.
Recommend: Use legacy mode only with documented compensating controls and migration plan.
Avoid: Avoid silently mixing parameters across clients/languages.
Recommend: Use authenticated modes (for example GCM) with explicit nonce handling.
Avoid: Avoid reusing IVs or mixing mode assumptions across services.
Recommend: Use AEAD mode (AES-GCM) with per-record IV and tag verification.
Avoid: Avoid bare encryption modes without integrity protection.
Recommend: Keep compatibility boundary isolated and add explicit MAC checks.
Avoid: Avoid expanding legacy mode to new internal services.
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salt.iv.ciphertextEncoding
Use it when you only need format conversion or transport safety.
Encryption
Use it when confidentiality matters.
Note: Encoding changes representation, while encryption is about restricting access.
AES encryption
Use it when data must be recovered later by authorized systems.
Hashing
Use it when you only need integrity checks or password verification, not recovery.
Note: Encryption is reversible with keys; hashing is intentionally irreversible.
AES-GCM
Use for modern systems needing confidentiality + integrity in one flow.
AES-CBC
Use only when legacy systems cannot migrate immediately.
Note: Authenticated encryption reduces misuse risk in multi-service integrations.
Random IV/nonce
Use for every production encryption event.
Fixed IV
Use only in controlled test vectors for interoperability checks.
Note: Nonce/IV reuse is a high-impact cryptographic failure mode.
AES-GCM or AEAD mode
Use for almost all modern application data protection.
Legacy unauthenticated mode
Use only for compatibility with legacy systems plus external MAC.
Note: Confidentiality without integrity can allow silent ciphertext tampering.
Q01
No. Strong encryption still depends on password quality and how the secret is handled afterward.
Q02
Wrong password, malformed salt/iv segments, or a damaged payload format are the usual reasons.
Cause: Encryption is undermined quickly when the password is predictable or reused broadly.
Fix: Use strong unique passphrases and avoid reusing shared team secrets.
Cause: Repeated IV usage leaks structural information and weakens confidentiality guarantees.
Fix: Generate a fresh random IV per encryption and store/transmit it with the ciphertext metadata.
Goal: Turn a short string into an encrypted payload for safer temporary sharing.
Result: You get a compact encrypted blob without leaving the browser.
Goal: Protect sensitive fixture fields while still letting teammates reproduce a bug.
Result: Teams can collaborate on debugging without exposing raw secrets in tickets or chat.
Goal: Ensure frontend and backend use compatible AES modes and parameters.
Result: Cross-platform encryption works reliably in production traffic.
Goal: Encrypt tenant secrets with key rotation support and integrity checks.
Result: Data remains confidential and tamper-evident across key rotations.
Goal: Keep producer and consumer services interoperable during encryption rollout.
Result: Inter-service encryption failures are caught before production.
AES Encrypt / Decrypt is most reliable with real inputs and scenario-driven decisions, especially around "Modern API payload protection".
Yes, AES-GCM is a modern authenticated encryption mode and is widely used when implemented with random IVs and strong keys.
PBKDF2 derives a strong encryption key from your password and salt, making brute-force attacks harder.
Yes, as long as they use the same payload structure and compatible AES-GCM + PBKDF2 parameters.
Decryption will not be possible. This tool cannot recover lost passwords.
No. Encryption and decryption run entirely in your browser and data is not sent to servers.
No. It is for utility and testing workflows, not a replacement for enterprise key management systems.